

# Lessons from Market-based Approaches for Watershed Protection: Water Quality Trading in the Chesapeake Bay Region



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***Eye on LAC:  
Green-Gray Infrastructure:  
The Case for Investment***

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How to create incentives for optimal grey-green infrastructure investments in watershed protection?

- Command-and-control
- Incentive-based payment-for-watershed-services (PWS) approaches
  - Government taxes or subsidies
  - Beneficiary-financed
  - Market-based (cap-and-trade)

A market-based approach: water quality trading (WQT)

- Require sources to reduce pollutant loadings to their watershed (regulatory cap)
- Give sources the option to purchase load reductions (credits) from other sources (trading)

Given similarities between WQT and other PWS approaches, what can we learn from experience with WQT?


# Water Quality Trading Programs in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed



- Nutrient Credit Trading
  - **Virginia** passed initial trading program legislation in 2005. In 2013 enacted rules for urban developments to purchase nutrient offsets.
  - **Pennsylvania** established first trading policy in 2005 (legislation in 2010)
  - **Maryland** established policy in 2008
- In 2010, US Environmental Protection Agency established Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) limits to Bay for nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment
- **Washington, DC** established Stormwater Retention Credit Trading Program in 2013

# Potential Savings from Shifting Towards Green Infrastructure Approaches

- Economic study (CBC, 2012) estimated millions in potential savings for point sources if they had the option to purchase load reduction credits from agricultural nonpoint sources
- Co-benefits (carbon storage, air quality, recreation) from these green infrastructure approaches could be even larger than the potential cost savings (EPA, 2011)



# Actual Gains from Nutrient Credit Trading Have Been Far Less

- Pennsylvania
  - the only program allowing point sources to meet *current* obligations through credit purchases from nonpoint sources
  - TMDL in 2010 created demand for credits, but the total volume of trades has been limited
    - In 2014, only 7 sellers of nonpoint source credits (mostly through aggregators)
    - In 2016, new stricter rules for nonpoint source credits has further limited trade
- Virginia
  - Program rules in effect preclude trading between point and nonpoint sources
  - Since 2012, new urban developments can purchase nonpoint source credits to offset a portion of nutrient
    - Must be permanent credits (conversion of agricultural land to forest)
    - 92 “nutrient banks” selling 3,300 phosphorus credits (lbs/yr)

# Factors Affecting Demand for Green Infrastructure Credits

	Type of Green Infrastructure (Nonpoint Source Credits)	
	Working Land Practices	Land Conversion Practices
<b>Stringency of Load Limit (Cap)</b>	+	+
<b>Cost of Compliance (without trade)</b>	+	+
<b>Buyer Eligibility Restrictions</b>	-	-
<b>Transaction Costs</b>		
Search costs	-	-
Contracting costs	--	-
Verification costs	--	-
<b>Flexibility of GI for Adaptive Mgmt</b>	++	+
<b>Uncertainty</b>		
GI maintenance	--	-
GI performance	-	-
Extreme events	-	-

# Factors Affecting Supply of Green Infrastructure Credits

	Type of Green Infrastructure (Nonpoint Source Credits)	
	Working Land Practices	Land Conversion Practices
<b>Seller Eligibility Restrictions</b>	-	-
<b>Additionality Requirements</b>	-	-
<b>Transaction Costs</b>		
Program learning costs	-	-
Search costs	-	-
Contracting costs	- -	-
<b>Flexibility for Adaptive Mgmt</b>	+ +	+

# Factors Affecting Supply of Green Infrastructure Credits (Cont'd)

	Type of Green Infrastructure (Nonpoint Source Credits)	
	Working Land Practices	Land Conversion Practices
<b>Cost of GI Implementation</b>		
Baseline requirement	-	-
Start up cost	-	--
O&M cost	--	-
Offsetting revenue	+	+
Uncertainty ratio/penalty	-	-
<b>Other Barriers</b>		
Loss of identity	-	--
Loss of privacy	--	-
Lack of trust	-	-



## Some implications for incentivizing green infrastructure approaches

- Third party aggregators/brokers have been effective for lowering transaction costs
- Land conversion practices can involve lower transaction costs, but they also offer less flexibility
- Uncertainty regarding GI performance must be acknowledged but should not be over-penalized
- When possible, compensate practices for co-benefits
  - Don't rule out “stacking” payments for multiple ecosystem services due to additionality concerns
- Practices with internal benefits can be self-sustaining and reduce verification costs
  - e.g., agroforestry practices